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Another Citadel Has Fallen-This
Time the Plaintiff's. California
Applies Comparative Negligence to
Strict Products Liability
INTRODUCTION
When the California Supreme Court handed down its decision
in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.,' heralding the dawn-
ing of strict products liability in tort, a great number of corporate
attorneys and private defense attorneys no doubt considered the
advantages of becoming plaintiffs' attorneys. The plaintiff's bur-
den of proof became much simpler and many of the defenses the
defendant could have previously raised were forever inhumed.
But after fifteen years of strict products liability law that for the
most part favored the plaintiff, a decision has been handed down
which leans towards balancing the scales of the adversary process
in strict products liability cases. Indeed, some writers will indubi-
tably contend that the scales have been tipped dramatically in
favor of the defendant, at least where the plaintiff was contribu-
torily negligent.
That decision was made in Daly v. General Motors Corp.,2
where the court held that pure comparative negligence applies to
cases brought under strict products liability theories. Before
Daly, when a defendant wanted to bring into evidence the negli-
gent conduct of the plaintiff, the plaintiff could usually character-
ize this conduct as contributory negligence thereby blocking off
the defendant's recriminations because any evidence of plaintiff's
contributory negligence was inadmissible in strict products liabil-
ity cases. The plaintiff's ability to shield himself from the defend-
ant's counter-assaults by characterizing his conduct as
contributory negligence armed him with a power that was similar
to that which the defendant had possessed for decades previous
to the decision in Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.3 That
ability constituted a citadel from which a party could effectively
cut off any assaulting opponent. The citadel defendant had used
1. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
2. 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1978).
3. 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
when a products liability action was brought against him was the
citadel of privity. Similarly, when a defendant attempted to ac-
cuse a plaintiff of contributory negligence he was cut off, for the
reason that contributory negligence was inadmissible in a strict
products liability case. Plaintiff too, had a citadel, a stronghold; it
was the mere words, "contributory negligence," and the ability to
characterize his conduct as such that threw up a barricade which
precluded the defendant from attacking that type of conduct.
The court in Daly v. General Motors Corp., did away with the
plaintiff's ability to characterize his conduct in such a way as to
preclude it from evidence. An even greater impact, however, was
felt when the Daly Court applied comparative negligence to strict
products liability. This comment begins with a brief history of
strict products liability law leading up to the Daly decision, then
it indulges in a pro and con discussion which helps illuminate the
importance and probable effects of that decision.
A COMPENDIOUS HISTORY
In William L. Prosser's comprehensive treatment of the devel-
opment of products liability law,4 he analyzes the assaults made
on the defenses and strongholds of the various defendants who
attempted to escape liability for the defective products they man-
ufactured. The main stronghold of the defendant was the "citadel
of privity"5 which insulated manufacturers from liability for the
injuries of a consumer who was injured by his defective product.
The consumer could not sue the manufacturer unless he was in
privity of contract. However, as Professor Prosser noted,6 this cit-
adel of privity fell in 1960 with the New Jersey Supreme Court's
decision in Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.7
Before Henningsen, the inroads made against the privity de-
fense are well known to most law students. First, the privity re-
quirement was rejected in cases involving foods, drugs and
cosmetics-"articles of such kind as to be imminently dangerous
4. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel, 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960), and Pros-
ser, The Fall of the Citadel, 50 MiNN. L. REV. 791 (1966). See also, PROSSER, LAW OF
TORTS § 96, at 641-644 (5th ed., 1971).
5. Justice Cardozo first referred to the "citadel of Privity" in Ultramares
Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 180, 174 N.E. 441, 445 (1931), where he said, [Tihe
assault upon the citadel of privity is proceeding in these days apace." And, of
course, the requirement of privity itself was first enunciated in Winterbottom v.
Wright, 10 M. & W. 109, 152 ENG. REP. 402 (1842). Some authorities say that the rule
of privity was mistakenly derived from Winterbottom v. Wright. See Bohlen, The
Basis of Affirmative Obligations in Tort, 44 Am. L. REG. N.S. 209, 280-285, 289-310
(1905), or 53 U. PA. L. REV. 209 (1905). But see, Lord Atkin, in Donoghue v. Steven-
sen, A. C. 562, 588-589 (1932).
6. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, 50 MINN. L. REV. 791 (1966).
7. 32 N. J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
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to human life or health unless care is exercised in their prepara-
tion"8-and later with regard to inherently dangerous products.
In these cases the wholesaler or manufacturer was held liable on
the basis of prudent public policy.9 Then, in MacPherson v. Buick
Motor Co.,1o the New York Court of Appeals held that despite
privity, the manufacturer "of a thing . . . that is reasonably cer-
tain to place life and limb in peril when negligently made ... is
under a duty to make it carefully."" The rule in MacPherson was
later extended to mere bystanders,12 property damage13 and other
areas.14
The importance of the Henningsen decision lies in the fact that
the court held defendants liable without any proof of negligence,
as the MacPherson decision required, or privity of contract. The
court stated that if an injury results as a consequence of a defec-
tive product, "strict liability is imposed . . . [and] [rJecovery of
damages does not depend upon proof of negligence or knowledge
of the defect."' 5 Of equal if not greater importance, the court also
stated:
Accordingly, we hold that under modern marketing conditions, when a
8. Boyd v. Coca Cola Bottling Works, 132 Tenn. 23, 28, 177 S. W. 80, 81 (1915).
See also, Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397, 57 Am. Dec. 455 (1852).
9. See, Boyd v. Coca Cola Bottling Works, 132 Tenn. 23, 177 S.W. 80 (1915) (ci-
gar butt in a coke bottle); Klein v. Duchess Sandwich Co., Ltd., 14 Cal. 2d 272, 93
P.2d 799 (1939) (a wrapped sandwich poisoned the wife of a man who purchased
it); Gottsdanker v. Cutter Laboratories, 182 Cal. App. 2d 602, 6 Cal. Rptr. 320 (1960)
(salk polio vaccine caused the disease of poliomyelitis in patients who received it).
For a general discussion see, 2 WrrIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, SALES §§ 91-
99, at 1156-63 (8th ed. 1973).
10. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
11. 217 N.Y. at 389, 111 N.E. at 1053. Thus, New York, and the states that fell in
line with its MacPherson decision based manufacturer's liability on negligence,
not contract, thereby avoiding the privity problem. Still, this fell short of strict lia-
bility, so plaintiffs next attempted to get around the burdens of proof required by
a negligence action by arguing an expressed or implied warranty. But here again,
the privity requirement became a barrier to holding defendent liable, until Hen-
ningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., put an end to that requirement.
12. See, Reed & Bargon Corp. v. Maas, 73 F.2d 359 (1st Cir. 1934); Flies v. Fox
Bros. Buick Co., 196 Wis. 196, 218 N.W. 855 (1928); McLeod v. Linde Air Products
Co., 318 Mo. 397, 1 S.W. 2d 122 (1927); Hopper v. Charles Cooper & Co., 104 N.J. 93,
139 A. 19 (1927).
13. Sutton v. Diimmel, 55 Wash. 2d 592, 349 P.2d 226 (1960); Washborn Storage
Co. v. General Motors Corp., 90 Ga. App. 380, 83 S.E.2d 26 (1954); Ellis v. Lindmark,
177 Minn. 390, 225 N.W. 395 (1929).
14. See generally, William L. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel, 69 YALE
L.J. 1099 (1960).
15. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 366, 161 A.2d 69, 77
(1960).
manufacturer puts a new automobile in the stream of trade and promotes
its purchase by the public, an implied warranty that it is reasonably suita-
ble for use as such accompanies it into the hands of the ultimate pur-
chaser. Absence of agency between the manufacturer and the dealer who
makes the ultimate sale is immaterial. 16
In California, Justice Traynor, in his concurring opinion in Es-
cola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co.,17 was the first to advance the idea
that a manufacturer should be held strictly liable in tort without
regard to privity of contract or negligence when he places an arti-
cle on the market, knowing that it will be used without inspection,
and such article proves defective and causes injury to human be-
ings.18 Ultimately, in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.,19
with Justice Traynor writing the majority opinion, the court cited
with approval the decision in Henningsen, but went beyond that
holding by concluding that strict liability did not require a basis
in contract warranty theories but could be based on strict liability
in tort.20 Accordingly, the court held that "[a] manufacturer is
strictly liable in tort when an article he places on the market,
knowing that it is to be used without inspection for defects,
proves to have a defect that causes injury to a human being."21
The court noted that this liability is "imposed by law," "not as-
sumed by agreement."22 To establish the manufacturer's liability
it is sufficient that plaintiff prove he was injured while using the
product in a way it was intended to be used, and that the injury
was a result of a defect in design and manufacture, of which
plaintiff was not aware, that made the product unsafe for its in-
tended use.23
The decisions discussed, from Boyd v. Coca Cola Bottling
Works to Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., highlight what
can be seen as a major assault on a manufacturer's or whole-
saler's ability to defend himself in a products liability suit. One
by one the defenses or theories defendants hid behind were shat-
tered and they were left exposed to plaintiffs who could attack
with less arms, while being sheltered by barricades that effec-
tively prevented defendants counter-assaults. Now, with strict
products liability, the plaintiff need not be armed with proof of
negligence or privity of contract; he simply needs to prove that a
16. Id. at 384, 161 A.2d at 84.
17. 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944).
18. Id. at 461, 150 P.2d at 440.
19. 59 Cal.2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
20. Id. at 63, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701.
21. Id. at 62, 377 P.2d at 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700.
22. Id. at 63, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701.
23. 59 Cal. 2d at 64, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701. Note also that the
Greenman doctrine of strict liability in tort was extended to the retailer in Van-
dermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1964).
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defect existed in the product which is attributable to the manu-
facturer or retailer and that the defect caused the injury.24 In
Ault v. International Harvestor Co., the court stated that, "[iJn an
action based upon strict liability against a manufacturer, negli-
gence or culpability is not a necessary ingredient. The plaintiff
may recover if he establishes that the product was defective, and
he need not show that the defendants breached a duty of due
care."
25
The barricades that prevented a defendant's counter-assaults
were the rules of law that precluded a defendant from admitting
evidence of plaintiff's contributory negligence, and to a certain ex-
tent, his nonuse of a product's safety devices in a strict products
liability case. In Bill Loeper Ford v. Hites,26 the defendant's con-
tributory negligence-driving 20 miles per hour in a 55 mile per
hour zone-did not allow the plaintiff to be indemnified by the de-
fendant when the plaintiff was found liable for injuries caused to
the defendant's passenger. The court held:27
We see that in the development of strict liability it has now been deter-
mined that a plaintiff can still recover even though he may have been con-
tributorily negligent in using the product. (Luque v. McLean,2 8 supra.)
Plaintiff here is seeking to interject the concept of fault in an indemnifica-
tion case between a retailer and the driver of a defective automobile. The
Supreme Court has repeatedly indicated that a retailer is strictly liable,
regardless of fault. To allow indemnification because Hites was actively
negligent in driving the automobile is the antithesis of strict liability.
Plaintiff attempts to shift the liability for selling a defective automobile to
the driver simply because he used the automobile in such a way as to ex-
pose the design defect. The present status of strict liability prohibits this
avoidance of accountability. The court in Cronin,2 9 supra, held that a
manufacturer must take the occurrence of an accident (i.e., the negligence
of a driver) into consideration in designing the vehicle.
In Horn v. General Motors Corp.,30 an action was brought
against a car manufacturer for injuries sustained in a so-called
"second collision." 31 The plaintiff reached her hand across the
24. Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal.3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433
(1972). For a discussion of the meaning of "defect" see Levine, Strict Products Li-
ability and Comparative Negligence: The Collision of Fault and No-Fault, 14 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 337, 338 (1977).
25. 13 Cal.3d 113, 118, 528 P.2d 1148, 1150 (1974), 117 Cal. Rptr. 812, 814.
26. 47 Cal. App. 3d 828, 121 Cal. Rptr. 131 (1975).
27. 47 Cal. App. 3d at 835-36, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 136. (Footnotes added).
28. 8 Cal. 3d 136, 501 P.2d 1163, 104 Cal. Rptr. 443 (1972).
29. Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433
(1972).
30. 17 Cal. 3d 359, 551 P.2d 398, 131 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1976).
31. As noted in Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 730-31, 575 P.2d
steering wheel in an attempt to swerve and thereby avoid an on-
coming car and in doing so she knocked off the horn cap, leaving
exposed three sharp prongs with which her face came into con-
tact when she ran into a concrete abutment. These injuries could
have most likely been avoided if the plaintiff had used her
seatbelts. Outside the presence of a jury, the defendant con-
tended that "failure to use seatbelts was a misuse of the automo-
bile and that if plaintiff had been using the seat belts at the time
of the accident, her injuries would have been substantially re-
duced."32 The court in Horn affirmed the trial court's ruling that
such evidence of nonuse of seatbelts was inadmissible on the
grounds that the plaintiff's contributory negligence was not an is-
sue.33 The plaintiff was, in effect, able to attack the design of de-
fendant's car while sheltering herself from counter-assaults that
would have allowed the jury to consider her own possible contrib-
utory negligence.
PLAINTIFF'S CITADEL FALLS-Daly v. General Motors Corp.
With the above historical stage set, the California Supreme
Court was faced with a situation where an intoxicated driver not
wearing his seatbelt, collided with a metal divider fence while
travelling at a speed of fifty to seventy miles per hour along a ma-
jor freeway.3 4 During the collision with the fence his door was al-
legedly forced open because a defectively made door handle was
pushed in. The plaintiffs, whose action in Daly v. General Motors
Corp.35 was based on strict products liability for the defective
door handle on the car, argued that the evidence of intoxication
and nonuse of safety devises was inadmissable "since contribu-
tory negligence was not a defense to an action founded in strict
liability for a defective product."3 6 The plaintiffs were asking the
court to allow them to attack defendants while remaining in the
safety of a citadel that protected them from the defendants'
counter-offensive which would have exposed to the jury that pos-
sibly the real cause of the accident was the plaintiffs intoxication
and his nonuse of seatbelts. While decades of court decisions had
broken down the barricades and citadels that sheltered defend-
ants from assailing plaintiffs, some citadels had been constructed
1162, 1164, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380, 382 (1978), a "second collision" is one in which the
defect in the product did not contribute tq the original impact, but only to the en-
hancement of injury.
32. 17 Cal. 3d 359, 369, 551 P.2d at 403-404, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 83-84.
33. Id. at 370, 551 P.2d at 403, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 83.
34. Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr.
380 (1978).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 745, 575 P.2d at 1174, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 392.
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for the plaintiffs' benefit which have effectively protected them
from the defendants' counterattacks. Defendants could still use
the defenses of assumption of risk and misuse 37 but the courts'
willingness to allow these had lessened in recent years.
At the trial court level of the Daly v. General Motors Corp. deci-
sion, the trial judge allowed the nonuse of seatbelt and intoxica-
tion evidence, the former in that such evidence would bar
recovery on the theory of product misuse, and the latter on the
theory that such evidence was relevant to the decedent's failure
to use the car's safety devices. 38 The Supreme Court noted that
the trial preceded rendition of the opinion in Horn v. General Mo-
tors Corp.39 The court of appeal, basing its decision on Horn, re-
versed the jury's judgment in the defendants' favor. At this point,
the plaintiffs were exultant; they could conceivably go back to the
trial court, attack the defective design of the defendants' product
and hide in a citadel (called contributory negligence) that would
preclude the defendants from exposing what are arguably the
weaknesses of the plaintiffs' case. On appeal, however, defend-
ants came up with a theory that had been on the drawing boards
of California law for at least the last six years4O and which had al-
ready been applied in several other states. They argued that the
principles of pure comparative negligence as adopted by Califor-
nia in the Supreme Court case of Li v. Yellow Cab Co.,41 should
be applicable to strict products liability. Why? Mainly because it
would "[f urther the public policies underlying California tort
law," and because it is more equitable.42
The California Supreme Court in Daly v. General Motors Corp.
accepted the above argument;43 pure comparative negligence now
applies to strict products liability. Now, on retrial, the evidence of
intoxication and nonuse of safety devices can be introduced
against the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs can introduce their evidence
of the defendants' defectively designed car but cannot hide from
the fact that they might have been contributorily negligent-their
37. Id. at 738, 575 P.2d at 1169, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 387.
38. Id. at 745, 575 P.2d at 1174, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 392.
39. See text accompanying note 30.
40. See authorities noted in 20 Cal. 3d 725, 740-741, 575 P.2d at 1171, 144 Cal.
Rptr. at 389.
41. 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975).
42. See, L.A. Number 30687, Respondent's Supplemental Brief at 2, Daly v.
General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1978).
43. 20 Cal. 3d 725, 730, 575 P.2d at 1164, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 382 (1978).
citadel fell. As the court declared, the manufacturer's "exposure
will be lessened only to the extent that the trier finds that the vic-
tim's conduct contributed to his injury."" Among the myriad re-
sults that are possible on retrial, it is conceivable that the jury
who must now apply "comparative fault"45 principles, could find
the plaintiffs' decedent ninety-five percent at fault and the
defendants five percent at fault. Assuming that the jury con-
cluded that the plaintiffs' damages equaled one hundred thou-
sand dollars, they would award the plaintiffs five thousand dollars
accordingly.
The court found that by applying the principles of Li to strict
products liability, one "felicitous result" would occur. Those last
vestiges, those last strongholds of the defendant, that could aid
him in totally defending a strict products liability case, assump-
tion of risk and product misuse, could be done away with.46 The
court held that "[i] n each instance the defense, if established, will
reduce but not bar plaintiff's claim."47
It is as if all the castles, walls, barricades, and flanges of Sparta
and Athens were brought to the ground and the troops of both ad-
versaries forced to fight man for man on open ground, and on the
mountains, seated in ornate chairs and surrounded by attendants,
sat the kings who had come from afar from impartial countries.
Finally, at the end of the day they determined the percentage of
victory that would be awarded to each side and thereafter divided
the spoils accordingly.
Are the sides in the battle equal? Was the decision "fair"48 as
the court says it was? What follows is a pro and con analysis.
THE PROS
A concentrated analysis of the Daly v. General Motors Corp. de-
cision cannot help but expose a struggle between philosophical
arguments on one hand and legal arguments on the other. The
court took a quantum leap in Daly when it applied comparative
fault49 to strict products liability and it did so because it was "fair
to do so." 50 A strict application of precedent would have pre-
44. Id. at 737, 575 P.2d at 1169, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 387.
45. Id. at 742, 575 P.2d at 1172, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 390.
46. Id. at 738, 575 P.2d at 1169-1170, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 387-388. The court in Daly
noted that assumption of risk and product misuse or any other variant of contribu-
tory negligence was to be merged into comparative principles, just as assumption
of risk was expressly merged into comparative principles in Li v. Yellow Cab Co.,
13 Cal. 3d 804, 825, 533 P.2d 1226, 1241, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858, 873 (1975).
47. 20 Cal. 3d 725, 738, 575 P.2d at 1170, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 388.
48. 20 Cal. 3d at 742, 575 P.2d at 1172, 144 Cal. Rptr at 390.
49. Id.
50. Id.
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cluded the decision in Daly, but, as was proven in Li v. Yellow
Cab Co.,51 the court is willing to adopt a rule contrary to one hun-
dred years of precedent if it is "irresistible to reason and all intel-
ligent notions of fairness. '52
A. The Proper Step After Li v. Yellow Cab Co.
The court in Li held that the "all-or-nothing" rule of contribu-
tory negligence, which bars all recovery when the plaintiff's negli-
gent conduct contributes in any degree to the harm suffered by
him, would henceforth be replaced by a system of pure compara-
tive negligence "under which liability for damage will be borne by
those whose negligence caused it in direct proportion to their re-
spective fault."5 3 The court noted that "logic, practical experi-
ence, and fundamental justice counsel against the retention of the
doctrine rendering contributory negligence a complete bar to re-
covery" in a negligence action.54
The pros, 55 those who advocated the application of the compar-
ative fault principles expounded by Li to strict products liability,
literally jumped on the Li decision and the words it used to jus-
tify its holding. They could not have been happier when the court
stated, "Our decision in this case is to be viewed as a first step in
what we deem to be a proper and just direction, not as a compen-
dium containing the answers to all questions that may be ex-
pected to arise."56
The first step taken in Li, a step which basically said, let fault
51. 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975).
52. Id. at 811, 532 P.2d at 1231, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 863.
53. Id. at 813, 532 P.2d at 1232, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 864.
54. Id. at 812-13, 532 P.2d at 1232, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 864.
55. The pros referred to here are the defendants-respondents in Daly v. Gen-
eral Motors Corp. See, L.A. Number 30687, Respondent's Supplemental Brief,
Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1978).
Note also other advocatres of the Daly decision; SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLI-
GENCE § 12.1 et seq., at 195 et seq. (1974) (see also SPECIAL CAL. SUPPLEMENT RE:
Nga Li v. Yellow Cab Co. of California § 4(b), at 8 (1975); Epstein, Products
Liability: Defenses Based on Plaintiffs Conduct, 1968 UTAH L. REV. 267, 284 (1968);
Fleming, The Supreme Court of California 1974-1975 - Forward: Comparative Neg-
ligence at Last - By Judicial Choice, 64 CAL. L. REV. 239, 269-271 (1976); Noel, De-
fective Products, Abnormal Use, Contributory Negligence and Assumption of Risk,
25 VAND. L. REV. 93, 117-118 (1972); Wade, A Uniform Comparative Fault
Act-What Should it Provide? 10 U. OF MICH. J. L. REF. 220 (1977); Wade, On the
Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 850 (1973).
56. Cited in L.A. Number 30687, Respondent's Supplemental Brief at 2, Daly v.
General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1978). Li v.
Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 826, 532 P.2d 1226, 1242, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858, 874 (1975).
be placed where fault lies, was a positive step already adopted by
a growing number of other jurisdictions. 57
B. The Trend Towards Comparative Fault
In the 1976 decision of Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting
Goods, Inc.,58 the Supreme Court of Alaska held:
We feel that pure comparative negligence can provide a predicate of fair-
ness to products liability cases in which the plaintiff and defendant con-
tribute to the injury. The defendant is strictly liable due to the existence
of a defective condition in the product. On the other hand, the plaintiff's
liability attaches as a result of his conduct in using the product. It is ap-
propriate, therefore, that the parties' contribution to the injury be appor-
tioned. The defendant is strictly liable for the harm caused from his
defective product, except that the award of damages shall be reduced in
proportion to the plaintiff's contribution to his injury.5 9
In 1975, the United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Ed-
wards v. Sears, Roebuck and Co.,60 applied Mississippi law to
hold that when the trial court instructed "the jury that if it found
that the decedent was contributorily negligent, but that the de-
fendants also proximately caused or contributed to George Ed-
wards' death, damages could be recovered but must be reduced in
proportion to the extent to which decedent's negligence contrib-
uted to the accident . .., [that] the correct path through the
thicket of strict [products] liability and contributory negli-
gence" 61 was taken.
These decisions and others 62 often cited important legal schol-
ars63 to bolster their decisions to allow the plaintiff's fault to be
57. Edwards v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 512 F.2d 276 (5th Cir. 1975), applying
Mississippi Law; Rodrigues v. Ripley Industries, Inc., 507 F.2d 782, 786 (1st Cir.
1974), applying New Hampshire law; Coons v. Washington Mirror Works, Inc., 344
F. Supp. 653 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), applying New York law; Butaud v. Suburban Marine
& Sporting Goods, Inc., 555 P.2d 42 (Alaska Sup. Ct. 1976); West v. Caterpillar Trac-
tor Co., Inc., 336 So. 2d 80 (Fla. Sup. Ct. 1976); Haney v. International Harvester
Co., 201 N.W. 2d 140 (Minn. Sup. Ct. 1972); City of Franklin v. Badger Ford Truck
Sales, Inc., 207 N.W. 2d 866 (Wis. Sup. Ct. 1973); Dipple v. Sciano, 155 N.W. 2d 55
(Wis. Sup. Ct. 1967).
58. 555 P.2d 42 (Alaska Sup. Ct. 1976).
59. Id. at 45-46. (Footnotes omitted). The Butaud decision is worth special
notation in that the Alaskan Supreme Court in the 1965 decision of Butaud v. Sub-
urban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc., 543 P.2d 209 (1975), had adopted the exact
California formulation of strict tort liability which developed from the Greenman
v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963),
Cronin v. J. B. E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972),
and, Luque v. McLean, 8 Cal. 3d 136, 501 P.2d 1163, 104 Cal. Rptr. 443 (1972), deci-
sions. However, note one authority who said that the decision in Butaud was a
"[fjlagrant disregard for the controlling nature of the theoretical basis of [strict
products] liability." Leving, Strict Products Liability and Comparative Negligence:
The Collision of Fault and No-Fault, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 337, 355 (1977).
60. 512 F.2d 276 (5th Cir. 1975).
61. Id. at 290.
62. Supra note 57.
63. Supra note 55.
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compared with the defendant's. Professor John W. Wade is an
oft-cited authority who has said that when trying to reconcile
strict liability with contributory negligence, "[the] solution
should be apparent on reflection. It is to apply a system of com-
parative fault of the 'pure type' and to apply it to strict liability as
well as to negligence." 64 Indeed, in California it is arguably incon-
sistent and invites theory shopping to have strict liability without
comparative principles when negligence without comparative
principles was held to be an "all or nothing" vice which the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court found unfair in Li. With but few excep-
tions, most jurisdictions which have comparative negligence
principles apply them to strict products liability actions. 65 As the
Daly v. General Motors Corp. decision noted,66 citing Dean Pros-
ser, to perpetuate a system disallowing comparative principles in
strict products liability, would place "upon one party the entire
burden of a loss for which two are, by hypothesis, responsible." 67
C. The Positive Results in the Federal Admiralty Courts
In advocating the advantages of comparative negligence princi-
ples in strict liability cases, one problem the proponents had to
grapple with was the possible difficulties that could be encoun-
tered when those principles were applied to non-negligence cases.
If a jury found that a plaintiff was contributorily negligent and
that the defendant's product was defective, how could that jury
fairly and consistently proportion the damages?
Initially, it should be noted that when the Li court was faced
with similar objections it held:
The existence of the foregoing areas of difficulty and uncertainty (as
well as others which we have not here mentioned-see generally
Schwartz, supra [Comparative Negligence] § 21.1, pp. 335-339 (1974)) has
not diminished our conviction that the time for a revision of the means for
dealing with contributory fault in this state is long past due and that it lies
within the province of this court to initiate the needed change by our deci-
sion in this case.6 8
64. Wade, Strict Tort Liability, 44 Miss. L. J. 825, 850 (1973).
65. Supra note 57. Exceptions: Melia v. Ford Motor Co., 534 F.2d 795 (8th Cir.
1976) (the court would not apply Nebraska's comparative negligence statute);
Kinard v. Coats Company, Inc., 553 P.2d 835 (Colo. App. 1976) (the court disal-
lowed comparative fault); Kirkland v. General Motors Corp., 521 P.2d 1353 (Okla.
1974) (the comparative negligence statute was restricted to negligence actions).
66. 20 Cal. 3d 725, 742, 575 P.2d 1162, 1172, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380, 390 (1978).
67. PROSSER, TORTS § 67, at 433 (4th ed. 1971).
68. 13 Cal. 3d 804, 826, 532 P.2d 1226, 1241, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858, 873 (1975).
More importantly, however, the proponents found much help
from, and the court in Daly, much solace in, the fact that Federal
Admiralty Courts have been applying comparative principles to
non-negligence situations for more than eighty years. A seaman,
whose injuries are proximately caused by the unseaworthiness of
a vessel, may recover without regard to negligence. 69 However,
the rule developed early in federal courts that negligence on the
part of the seaman would cause a reduction in his awarded dam-
ages but not bar his claim under "unseaworthiness," which is a
form of strict liability. In Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn,7 0 the
United States Supreme Court stated that:
The harsh rule of the common law under which contributory negligence
wholly barred an injured person from recovery is completely incompatible
with modern admiralty policy and practice. Exercising its traditional dis-
cretion, admiralty has developed and now follows its own fairer and more
flexible rule which allows such consideration of contributory negligence in
mitigation of damages as justice requires.7 1
As the Daly court found, when the fault of the plaintiff and de-
fendant has been compared in Admiralty cases, "[njo serious
practical difficulties appear to have arisen even where jury trials
are involved. '72
D. Balancing the Scales
At the heart of the proponents' arguments has been a recogni-
tion that California has come a long way in eliminating burden-
some factors which have hampered plaintiffs' attempts to recover
for injuries resulting from defendants' defective products. And
now, more than ever, the public is "insure[d] that the costs of in-
juries resulting from defective products are borne by the manu-
facturers that put such products on the market rather than by the
injured persons who are powerless to protect themselves."7 3 The
public has questioned, however, the reasonableness of allowing a
plaintiff to fire away without restrictions at a defendant, while be-
ing able to retreat behind a citadel that blockades any introduc-
tion of contributory negligence evidence. It is, indeed, arguable
that a plaintiff who was contributorily negligent, e.g., intoxicated
69. See, Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539, 550 (1960); Mahnich v.
Southern Steamship Co., 321 U.S. 96, 100 (1944); The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158, 175
(1903).
70. 346 U.S. 406 (1953).
71. Id. at 408-409.
72. 20 Cal. 3d at 739, 575 P.2d at 1170, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 388, citing Price v.
Mosler, 483 F.2d 275, 277-278 (5th Cir. 1973). See, Houston-New Orleans, Inc. v.
Page Engineering Co., 353 F. Supp. 890, 900 (1972), for an example of how a judge
apportioned fault.
73. Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63, 377 P.2d 897, 901,
27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1963).
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and not using safety devices, was not "powerless to protect him-
self." Further, it is arguably unreasonable to hold a defendant re-
sponsible for a plaintiff's negligence and thereby have him spread
the costs through society and to individual consumers, by higher
prices for his goods, when those consumers had nothing to do
with the accident. 74 Innocent consumers in essence, have been
suffering the consequences of contributorily negligent plaintiffs in
addition to the consequences of negligent defendants.
THE CONS
A. The Jury Cannot "Compare Fault" with a No-Fault Theory of
Law
Central to the cons 75 argument is the contention that the court
or the jury cannot compare "apples and oranges."76 A comparison
between a plaintiff's contributory negligence and a defendant's
defective product is impossible absent a showing of negligence on
the part of the defendant. As noted by Professor Harvey R. Le-
vine, when considering whether it is reasonable to apply the Li
principles of comparative negligence to strict products liability,
"the crucial question . . .is whether the strict products liability
action rests on a theoretical foundation of fault. If the strict liabil-
ity action does not proceed on a fault basis, it would be illogical to
consider the nature of the plaintiff's conduct to determine liability
in proportion to fault."77
The weight of authority in California supports the proposition
that strict products liability is imposed regardless of fault. As
noted earlier,78 in Bill Loeper Ford v. Hites, when confronted with
a retailer who sold a defective car to a defendant, the court stated
that, "[pjlaintiff here is seeking to interject the concept of fault in
74. See, Schwartz, Strict Liability and Comparative Negligence, 42 TENN. L.
REV. 171, 179 (1974).
75. The cons are the Plaintiffs-Appellants in Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20
Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1978). See also, Hickey, Comparative
Fault and Strict Products Liability: Are They Compatible: 5 PEPPERDINE L. REV.
501 (1978); Levine, Strict Products Liability and Comparative Negligence: The Col-
lision of Fault and No-Fault, 14 SAN DIEGL L. REV. 337 (1977); Robinson, Square
Pegs (Products Liability) in Round Holes (Comparative Negligence). 52 STATE
BAR J. 16 (1977).
76. Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 734, 575 P.2d 1162, 1167, 144
Cal. Rptr. 380, 383 (1978).
77. Levine, Strict Products Liability and Comparative Negligence: The Colli-
sion of Fault and No-Fault, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 337, 352 (1977).
78. Supra note 24 and accompanying text.
an indemnification case between a retailer and the driver of a de-
fective automobile. The Supreme Court has repeatedly indicated
that a retailer is strictly liable, regardless of fault. ' 79 And, again,
as noted earlier, the court in Ault v. International Harvestor Co.
declared that, "In an action based upon strict liability against a
manufacturer, negligence or culpability is not a necessary ingredi-
ent."80
In essence, the cons are demonstrating that too many theoreti-
cal and semantic differences exist between comparative negli-
gence and strict liability. Comparative negligence, therefore, is
best left to actions (negligence actions) where the defendant's
negligence is at issue. In Luque v. McLean,81 the court stated:
Ordinary contributory negligence does not bar recovery in a strict liabil-
ity action. "The only form of plaintiff's negligence'that is a defense to
strict liability is that which consists in voluntarily and unreasonably pro-
ceeding to encounter a known danger, more commonly referred to as as-
sumption of risk. For such a defense to arise, the user or consumer must
become aware of the defect and danger and still proceed unreasonably to
make use of the product."8 2
Thus, in Buccery v. General Motors Corp.,83 a strict products lia-
bility case, where assumption of risk was asserted as a defense,
the court was required to decide whether the principles ex-
pounded by Luque should apply or the principles of comparative
negligence set down by Li. The court concluded:
Comparative negligence, therefore, as adopted in Li, entails a compari-
son of the respective negligence of the plaintiff on the one hand and of the
defendant on the other. Strict liability for defective products is not based
upon defendant's negligence. There may be, therefore, no negligence of the
defendant to compare with that of plaintiff. It thus seems doubtful that Li
has superseded Luque in strict liability cases.
8 4
The problem, therefore, arises: How can comparative negligence
or comparative fault be applied to what the California cases have
called the non-fault doctrine of strict liability?8 5 As the court in
Daly noted, "Defendant's liability for injuries caused by a defec-
tive product remains strict."86
Ideally, an omniscient jury will hear both the evidence regard-
79. 47 Cal. App. 3d 828, 835-36, 121 Cal. Rptr. 131, 136 (1975).
80. 13 Cal. 3d 113, 118, 528 P.2d 1148, 1150, 117 Cal. Rptr 812, 814 (1974).
81. 8 Cal. 3d 136, 501 P.2d 1163, 104 Cal. Rptr. 443 (1972).
82. Id. at 145, 501 P.2d 1163, 1169-70, 104 Cal. Rptr. 443, 449-50. (Citations omit-
ted).
83. 60 Cal. App. 3d 533, 132 Cal. Rptr. 605 (1976).
84. Id. at 549, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 615. (Emphasis added).
85. Against what appears to be the weight of authority in California, Justice
Clark in his dissenting opinion in Horn v. General Motors Corp., 17 Cal. 3d 359, 372,
551 P.2d 398, 405, 131 Cal. Rptr. 78, 85 (1976), suggested that strict products liability
is based on fault. In accordance with this, see, Brewster, Comparative Negligence
in Strict Liability Cases, 42 J. AiR L. & COM. 107, 110 (1976).
86. 20 Cal. 3d 725, 737, 575 P.2d 1162, 1168, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380, 386 (1978).
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ing the defective product and the evidence regarding plaintiffs
contributory negligence, and from this decide what percentage of
fault lies with the defendant and what percentage lies with the
plaintiff. The cons argue, however, that this ideal is unachievable.
B. Plaintiffs Will be Compelled to Prove the "Negligence" of
Defendants
Those who will benefit most from the Daly87 decision, of course,
are defendants. As the cons see it, defendants will now be able to
place undue emphasis on the plaintiffs negligence. For a doctrine
that according to Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., was
designed primarily "to insure that the costs of injuries resulting
from defective products are borne by the manufacturers that put
such products on the market rather than by the injured persons
who are powerless to protect themselves," 88 a heavy burden of
proof has now been added to the plaintiff's side. The cons feel
that not only will the plaintiffs who were questionably negligent
have to prepare their own defenses but they will also have to
prove negligence on the part of the defendants. If the plaintiffs
don't prove negligence on the part of the defendants, then the ju-
rors will most likely be faced with a seemingly harmless defective
product on the one hand (e.g., a mere door handle with a button
that extended from the handle grip) and plaintiff's negligence on
the other at which the flamboyant defense attorney has now been
able to fire away at and possibly blow all out of proportion.
In strict products liability actions the goal has always been to
relieve the plaintiff's burden of proof. As noted in Cronin v. J. B.
E. Olson Corp.:89
Yet the very purpose of our pioneering efforts in this field [of strict prod-
ucts liability] was to relieve the plaintiff from problems of proof inherent
in pursuing negligence (Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., supra, 24 Cal. 2d
453, 461-462, [150 P.2d 436]) (Traynor, J., concurring) and warranty (Green-
man v. Yuba Power Products, Inc. supra, 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697,
701, [377 P.2d 897, 901]) remedies, and thereby "to insure that the costs of
injuries resulting from defective products are borne by the manufacturers
"90
87. See, L.A. Number 30687, Petitioner's Petition for Rehearing, and Appendix
to Petition for Rehearing; Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d
1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1978).
88. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63, 377 P.2d 897, 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1962).
89. 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 4333 (1972).
90. Id. at 133, 501 P.2d at 1162, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 442 (1972). The court in Cronin,
also noted: "We think that a requirement that a plaintiff also prove that the defect
It is now arguable, however, that with the Daly decision, the con-
tributorily negligent plaintiff in a strict products liability action is
back to base one. He's back to proving a defendant's negligence
and defending his own negligence. 91 If a plaintiff fails to do either
of these during trial, the jury will be unduly influenced in using
the comparative fault doctrine to award the plaintiff a much
smaller sum because defendant, who if not proven negligent, is
only responsible for a defective product which had probably
never hurt anyone before and probably wouldn't have this time
were it not for plaintiffs negligence. There is, therefore, less
chance for the policy reasons underlying strict products liability
law to be effectuated. That is, there is less assurance "that the
costs of injuries resulting from defective products are borne by
the manufacturers ... 92
C. The Inevitable Evidentiary Problems
It is important, at this point, to raise the question as to whether
it would be advantageous for the contributorily negligent plaintiff
to simply by-pass his action for strict products liability and pro-
ceed with a cause of action for negligence. In that, "[dI efendant's
liability for injuries caused by a defective product remains
strict, '93 it is questionable whether a plaintiff may introduce addi-
tional evidence of a defendant's negligence, besides the defective
product itself, for the jury to balance against plaintiff's negligence.
If the defendant's negligence is inadmissible under a case
brought on a strict products liability theory it may be advanta-
geous for the plaintiff to pursue his cause of action on a negli-
gence theory, especially if his contributory negligence is
susceptible to latent jury prejudices.
made the product 'unreasonably dangerous' places upon him a significantly in-
creased burden and represents a step backward in the area pioneered by this
court." Id. The court was concerned about burdens of proof that would place a
"considerably greater burden" upon plaintiff "than that articulated in Greenman."
Id. at 134-35, 501 P.2d at 1163, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 443. It seems that this rationale
could have precluded the decision in Daly v. General Motors Corp.
91. See, Justice Mosk's dissenting opinion in Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20
Cal. 3d 725, 757, 575 P.2d 1162, 1181, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380, 399 (1978), where he says:
This will be remembered as the dark day when this court, which heroi-
cally took the lead in originating the doctrine of products liability (Green-
man v. Yuba Power Products, Inc. (1963) 59 Cal. 2d 57, [27 Cal. Rptr. 697,
377 P.2d 897] and steadfastly resisted efforts to inject concepts of negli-
gence into the newly designed tort (Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., (1972) 8
Cal. 121, [104 Cal. Rptr. 433, 501 P.2d 1153], inexplicably turned 180 degrees
and beat a hasty retreat almost back to square one.
92. Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63, 377 P.2d 897, 901
27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1962).
93. Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 705, 737, 575 P.2d 1162, 1168, 144
Cal. Rptr. 380, 386 (1978).
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On the other hand, there is the problem that if defendant's neg-
ligence is admissible, the defendant is now in the favorable posi-
tion of being able to introduce evidence showing his lack of
negligence which before the Daly decision would have been most
likely barred. In other words, the defendant, perhaps a car manu-
facturer, will now be able to introduce mountains of evidence
demonstrating the care and precautions taken in the design and
manufacture of his car. Films, charts, blueprints, diagrams, sam-
ple tests, reports and data, not to mention myriad expert opin-
ions, will now be standard courtroom props for defense attorneys.
These props and devices could have the subtle effect of convinc-
ing the jury that defendant wasn't negligent, thereby lessening
plaintiff's award even though the defendant should be held
strictly liable.
Many of these problems are erased if, by chance, the plaintiff
was simply not contributorily negligent. In such a case plaintiff
must still prove that there was a defect in the defendant's product
and that it was that defect that caused his injuries. However, as
Appellants and Petitioners so assiduously argued in their brief
before the California Supreme Court in Daly v. General Motors
Corp. ,94 the vast majority of strict products liability cases involve
at least some conduct on the part of the plaintiff that the defend-
ant can exploit and argue is contributory negligence. The implica-
tions for the plaintiff are obvious: tread lightly and carry a big
shield.
THE PROS HAVE IT
Justice Richardson, speaking for the majority, succinctly
summed up the holding in Daly v. General Motors Corp. when he
said:
We conclude, accordingly, that the expressed purposes which persuaded
us in the first instance to adopt strict liability in California would not be
thwarted were we to apply comparative principles. What would be forfeit
is a degree of semantic symmetry. However, in this evolving area of tort
94. See, L.A. Number 30687, Petitioner's Petition for Rehearing, and Appendix
to Petition for Rehearing, Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d
1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1978). The Appendix to Petition for Rehearing contains a
vast compendium of cases, most of which show at least some conduct by plaintiff
that is arguably contributory negligence. Also, in the Petition for Rehearing, is a
section entitled, The Primer for Defense Attorneys in Defending Future Serious In-
jury Strict Products Liability Cases After Daly v. General Motors. This "Primer"
could be of interest to the unscrupulous defense attorney in a strict products lia-
bility case. On file at Pepperdine University School of Law, Law Review Office.
law in which new remedies are judicially created, and old defenses judi-
cially merged, impelled by strong considerations of equity and fairness we
seek a larger synthesis. If a more just result follows from the expansion of
comparative principles, we have no hesitancy in seeking it, mindful al-
ways that the fundamental and underlying purpose of Li was to promote
the equitable allocation of loss among all parties legally responsible in
proportion to their fault.
9 5
As if to complete the balancing of the scales, the court also held
that "assumption of risk" or "product misuse" would no longer
bar a claim in strict products liability, but would simply reduce a
plaintiff's recovery.96 The court felt that their decision constituted
"the next appropriate and logical step in the same direction" as
that which was taken in Li;97 that is, towards allocating fault
among all parties legally responsible. The step was taken, how-
ever, on shaky legs. In what was already a close four-three deci-
sion it would have been more advantageous if Justice Clark in his
concurring opinion, had demonstrated more resolve for the major-
ity's opinion. Instead, he said, "The present comparative system
is not only inequitable and arbitrary but also inconsistent and un-
predictable." 98 In essence, Justice Clark expressed agreement with
the majority's holding, but qualified his agreement by stating that
there is little chance that juries will arrive at consistent results.99
He advocated a uniform index factor which would consistently
discount a negligent plaintiff's recovery and thereby "eliminate
the necessity of the often impossible task of comparing fault."100
In any event, by concurring and remaining with the majority, Jus-
tice Clark has joined those who have voted to leave the allocation
process to the jury who must now learn to face the rigorous proc-
ess of comparing a plaintiff's contributory negligence with a de-
fendant's defective product.
CONCLUSIONS
The stage is now set. California has joined the march. Compar-
ative fault now applies to strict products liability. In a strict prod-
ucts liability action, the judge or jury may now consider the
plaintiff's contributory negligence and offset any recovery by the
amount of fault placed on that negligence. No longer does the de-
fendant have to bear the full burden of the plaintiff's contributory
negligence.
From the revered authorities of the law, the cloaked men of let-
95. 20 Cal. 3d at 737, 575 P.2d at 1169, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 387.
96. Id. at 738, 575 P.2d at 1169-70, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 387-88.
97. Id. at 747, 575 P.2d at 1175, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 393.
98. Id. at 750, 575 P.2d at 1177, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 395.
99. See, Clark, J., concurring opinion, Id. at 747, 575 P.2d at 1175, 144 Cal. Rptr.
at 393.
100. Id. at 749, 575 P.2d at 1176, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 394.
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ters, came a decree, founded on fairness and hope, which said
equalize the swords of the legal foemen and let us see which way
the scales doth tip.
The adversaries are in open field now, their troops and arms ex-
posed to discernment, the plaintiff's citadel has fallen, neither
side can retreat; the kings, hunched forward in their chairs, look
down in anticipation. But wait! One king has raised his arm; he
poses a question, "My fellow monarchs, what if at the end of the
day there are one hundred Knights left on Athen's side occupying
forty percent of the land, and on Sparta's side there are left, sixty
Knights and twenty chariots occupying sixty percent of the land?
How do we decide who is most victorious and divide the spoils ac-
cordingly?" As the kings rest back in their chairs, subdued into
pensive silence, one squire feeling sympathy for the emperors,
looks heavenward and whispers, "May they be wise dear Zeus,
may they be wise."
THOMAS G. GEHRING

